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FEBRUARY TERM, 1916. 
BINGHAM & GARFIELD RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
vs. 
NORTH UTAH MINING COMPANY1 
a Corporation; '_llHE RIGHT HON-~ No. 2877. 
ORABLE WILLIAM HOOD LORD 
WALTERAN; THE HONORABLE 
CYRIL A. LIDDLE, and WILLIAM 
ROBBINS. 
Defendants and Respondent8. 
Appeal from Thi1·d Judicial Dist'l·iet Court, Salt Lake 
Oounty, Utah, Ilon. J?. C. Loojbo1a-r·ow, Judqe. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT ROBBINS. 
In the month of June, 1910, the deefndant, Robbins, 
obtained a lease on all of the North Utah Mining Com-
pany's property, commanded by the No.2 Red Wing Tun-
nel. (Abs. p. 25.) This lease ran for two years and cov-
ered all of the ground which was embraced within the 
No.1 and No.2 tunnels, also that covered by the Robbins' 
tunnel, and all of the ground embraced in what was de-
scribed in the evidence as the Robbins stope. (Abs. 26.) 
Immediately after receiving the lease, Mr. Robbins 
hired an employee and also worked himself when occa-
sion required, and cleaned out Tunnel No. 1, occupymg 
about 35 or40 days in this work. (Abs. 27.) 
Afterwards the Robbins tunnel was started, as that 
was considered by the deefndant, Robbins, a more practi-
cal way of removing the ore. The Robbins' tunnel was 
run to strike the ore on the fissure and the bedded vein. 
The work on this tunnel had occupied possibly a month 
when the defendant was notified to quit work. An order 
of possession was given the plaintiff, and the defendant 
ceased work. This tunnel had been driven, including the 
open cut, about 40 or 45 feet. (Abs. p. 28.) 
The plaintiff took possession on the ground and 
drove a large tunnel through the mountain and imme-
diately above the Robbins' stope, and the workings con-
nected therewith. A large abutment was constructed, 
and the Robbins tunnel completely filled in. Large piers 
were constructed down the swale, immediately below the 
leased premises, and also on the leased premises, and a 
large force of men worked for the plaintiff until May, 
]911. The plaintiff occupied and used in this work all 
of Tract A, and the ground embraced within plaintiff's 
lease, and also used and occupied the ground off the right 
of way for a dump for the material removed in driving 
the tunnel. 
After the order of possession, the defendant Robbins, 
did no further work; he testified that 'after the company 
commenced work, he could do nothing because plaintiff 
had a large number of men there grading out for the big 
abutment which they built against his tunnel, and filled 
it in with concrete so he could not use it afterwards. The 
plaintiff's men were working from the mouth of the tun-
nel down to the road in the bottom of the canyon, and 
his tunnel was right at the point where the abutment was 
placed, and their work shut off the work of the Robbins' 
stope entirely. That before the plaintiff took possession, 
he had room to dump in the swale, and dumping could 
have been done without any expense. (Abs. pp. 20 and 
30.) 
That after the railroad was built, he could not dump 
on the right of way. That he had asked Mr. Goodrich if 
he could dump there, and the request had been refused. 
(Abs. pp. 30 and 405.) There was no dump room outside 
of the right of way. The hillside was much steeper on 
either side of the right of way than it was on the right of 
way, and the houses below made it practically impossible 
for him to dump there, and after the railroad was built, 
he could not take the ore from the Robbins' stope without 
putting in timbers to hold the track up; that it would not 
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be safe to mine there unless this was done, and the ex-
pense would not justify him in thus timbering the stope, 
and consequently he had to abandon the lease. (Abs. pp. 
30 and 31.) 
Counsel for plaintiff do not contend that the offer to 
amend or the offer to release certain of the condemned 
premises, and accept less than that asked for in the 
amended complaint, could affect the defendant Robbins. 
At the time of the first trial, and of course at the time of 
the second trial, Robbins' lease had long expired, anc.l 
he had no rights whatever in the premises. Mr. Ellis on 
behalf of the plaintiff stated in open court that the 
amendments or offer.s would not affect the plaintiff, Ron 
bins. (Abs. p. 330.) 
The only errors assigned and discussed, so far as 
affecting the defendant, Hobbins, is the giving of instruc-
tion No. 18, to the effect that after the order of posses-
sion, the deefndant, Robbins, had no right to dump rock or 
earth on the right of way unless the jury found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, subsequent 
to the court's order, gave the said Robbins permission to 
dump rock and earth upon said area, nor did the defen-
dant have any right to build any track across said right 
of way for the purpose of hauling the ore or waste, or for 
any other purpose, nor did he have any right after the 
order of possession, to work underground in the leased 
premises, if such work would have in any wise impaired 
the subjaeent sunport of the right of way. (See plain-
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tiff's brief, p. 26.) That the defendant, Robbins, was not 
acting in good faith in taking the lease and in driving 
the Robbins' stope. That the defendant, Robbins, suffered 
no damages. 
We will discuss these assignments in the same rela-
tive order as discussed by plaintiff in its brief. 
I. 
As to the right of the defendant, Robbins, to dump 
ore or waste 1rpon the right of way without the consent of 
the plaintiff, and to build a track across the same for his 
own conven1,ence. 
Plaintiff in its complaint asked for the tracts sought 
to be condemned in their entirety without any reserva-
tions or limitations whatsoever. It did not seek to qualify 
its demands in the original petition, or amendments there-
to, nor was any such limitation or qualification ever heard 
of until the close of plaintiff's case in the second trial, 
which was practically three years after the lease to Rob-
bins had expired. Counsel for plaintiff at the trial, 
strenuously sought to show that Robbins was granted 
permission by agents of the defendant company to dump 
on the right of way; thjs question was fairly submitted to 
the jury whether such p(:'rmjssion had been given or not. 
It must be further noted that the plaintiff occupied 
the entire tract from December, when it commenced 
work, until the following May; that is, men were work-
ing from the tunnel bore to the bottom of the canyon, were 
6 
blasting, dumping, excavating for abutments and piers, 
and driving immense tunnels in close proximity where 
the ore bodies of defendant Robbins were situated and do-
ing all work necessary for the erectio:n of its road and 
bridges. During that entire time it was absolutely impos-
sible for Robbins to do any work in connection with his 
lease. His tunnel was filled in, the abutment was built at 
the place where it was necessary for him to work, the rail-
road tunnel was a few feet overhead, and the only avail-
able dump room was occupied by the company. After the 
construction of the track, tunnels and bridges, the plain-
tiff still controlled the tracts it sought to condemn and 
had the right of absolute control over them. 
That the company has exclusive possession will be 
seen by the following authorities: 
''There is no question but that the company 
1s entitled to the exclusive possession of the 
right of way, if such possession is necessary to 
the proper operation of the road. Some courts 
hold that the company is entitled to such exclu-
sive possession from the nature of the case and 
as matter of law." 
2 Lewis Em. Dom. Sec. 84 7. 
''The use by a railway company of land 
condemned, for its road, is practically an exclu-
sive one, and permanent in its nature, unless the 
statute, or the court in its order, limits the ease-
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ment to be acquired by reserving certain rights 
and privileges to the land owner, or unless such 
limitation is conceded by the company.'' 
15 Cyc. page 1023, and cases cited. 
In the case of Guthrie, etc., Co. vs. Faulkner, Okla. 
73 Pac. 290, the court says : 
''Whether such an appropriation is called a 
fee simple title or merely an easement, it is ap-
parent that such an appropriation is a perma-
ment taking and holding of the real estate, to the 
exclusion of the owner, for all practical pur-
poses, and, while it is taken for an express pur-
pose, the effect as to the landowner is to deprive 
him of the use of his land.'' 
In St. Onge vs. Day-Col. 18 Pac. 279, it is held that: 
"The owner of land through which a railway 
company has the right of way, actually in use for 
railway purposes, cannot himself use such right 
of way, or recover for trespasses committed 
thereon by others; the railway company being en-
titled to the exclusive use thereof.'' 
In Wilmot vs. Railroad Company, Miss. 24 S. 701, 
the court says : 
"The duties imposed by law upon a railroad 
company of safely carrying persons and prop-
erty, and of protecting employees and other per-
sons lawfully upon the right of way from dam-
ages arising from any obstruction or hindrance 
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of the servants of the company in the perfor-
mance of their duties, and the responsibility laid 
upon the company for the performance of such 
duties, require the right and power in the officers 
of the company of excluding at their pleasure all 
persons from the right of way. The occupancy 
of the right of way by the railroad company is 
practically exclusive, and the owner of the ser-
vient estate, could cultivate it only by the con-
sent of the railroad company.'' 
See also: 
Railroad Company vs. Comstock, 22 Atl. 511; 
Hazen vs. Railway Company, 2 Gray 580; 
Brainerd vs. Clapp, 10 Cush. 12; 
Railway Company vs. Potter, 42 Vt. 275; 
Rand Em. Dom. Sec. 215. 
In Paxton vs. Railroad Company, Miss. 24 S., 536, it 
is held the owner of land through which a railroad passes 
has no right to cultivate the latter without its consent. 
See also: 
Railway Company vs. Cocks, et al., 22 N. Y. 
Sup. 1017; 
R. R. Co. vs. Olive, et al. N. C. 55, S. E. 263. 
In Boston etc. Railroad Company vs. Hunt, Mass. 
96 N. E. 140, the court holds: 
''The right of way, even if defined as a pub-
lic easement obtained by condemnation of the 
land, is substantially absolute so long as used for 
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the purposes of a railroad by the corporation, or 
those succeeding by legislative sanction to its 
rights. It is because of these characteristics of 
complete possession and control that damages 
for the taking are assessed upon the theory that 
the occupation will be permanent and practically 
exclusive.'' 
See: 
Presbrey vs. Railway Co. 103 Mass. 1. 
Barnes vs. Railroad Co. 130 Mass. 388. 
Steel Company vs. Railway, 187 Mass. 500; 
73 N. E. 646. 
In Hopkins et al. vs. Railway Company, Minn., 78 
N. W. 969, the court held (page 970): 
''The railroad company Is entitled to the 
exclusive possession of the land, unless other-
wise expressly provided in the order of the court, 
so long as it sees fit to use it for the purpose for 
which it was acquired; that it is for the railroad 
company and it alone to determine, when it deems 
it necessary or proper to use the land for such 
purposes, and when it takes possession, the bur-
den is not on it to show that the manner of the 
use is necessary. * * * There are manifest 
reasons, founded on public policy and necessity, 
why the possession of land acquired for railroad 
purposes should ordinarily be exclusively in the 
company, and not concurrently in it and the for-
mer owner. If the contention of the plaintiffs 
should prevail, it would produce interminable 
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vexatious litigation. The result would be that, 
every time a railway company attempted to take 
possession of property which it had acquired for 
a railroad purpose, it would be liable to be in-
volved in a contest with the former landowner 
over the question whether such possession was 
presently needed for the pupose for which the 
property was acquired, or whether the continued 
possession and use of the land, or some part of 
it, by the landowner, was compatible with its use 
by the company for the purpose for which it was 
condemned.'' 
In Railroad Company vs. Comstock, Conn., 22 Atl. 
511, the court says: 
''A land owner, through whose premises a 
railroad right of way has been condemned, cannot 
require that a crossing be kept open over the 
track in order that he may have more convenient 
access to portions of his land lying beyond it, 
though such crossing may not interfere with the 
use of the right of way for railroad purposes." 
"Counsel virtually rest their entire case, so far as the 
question under discussion is concerned, on the authority 
of Kansas City Railway Company vs. Allen, 22 Kan. 285. 
In that case the company contended that the owner 
of the premises would have a right of way to pass under 
the railroad track with his teams and stock. It presents 
a much different question from the one at bar. Certainly 
opposing counsel would not contend that the dumping of 
11 
ore and waste on the right of way, against steel stringers 
and braces and concrete pillars, is analogous to the driv-
ing of stock underneath the bridge, or that the building 
of a track for dump purposes is similar to walking across 
a right of way. 
Counsel in their brief say : 
''But where, as here, the line of railway track 
is constructed across a bridge some 200 feet in height 
above the surface of the ground and cars are run 
across this track, there would seem to be no reason 
for the rule giving exclusive possession to the sur-
face of the soil far below the railway track across 
which cars are operated. And this, too, where the 
railroad operators themselves, in the condemnation 
proceeding, are willing that the owner of the fee 
shall use the surface beneath the location of the track 
and state, under oath, that such use will not and can-
not interfere with or injure in any way the support, 
maintenance or operation of the line of railway 
across the right of way. 
The plaintiff in this action does not contend 
that the defendants or any of them would have the 
right to make any use whatever of that portion of 
the right of way consisting of the tunnel bore, sub-
ject to the right of the railway to operate its trains, 
because it is self-evident that the use by the owner 
of such tunnel would be a constant menace not only 
l to a proper operation of the railway company, but ,~r 
to the lives of the employees of the owner, as well 
as the lives of passengers which the railway com-
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pany might carry in its cars through the tunnel.'' 
Counsel concede that defendants could not use any 
portion of the right of way, consisting of the tunnel bore, 
and yet claim that they could use the right of way upon 
which the bridge is built. Is one more important than 
the other~ Isn't the safety of the bridge equally as im-
portant as the tunnel bore~ Let us assume the defendant 
has dumped earth and waste around the steel work of the 
bridge, and had endangered the safety of the bridge. 
Could not the railroad company compel him to desist~ 
(and we may remark in passing that the pictures of the 
bridge show that plaintiff itself has built woodwork 
around the steel for the very purpose of preventing the 
dirt from the natural surface getting thereon.) 
Let us assume that the defendant, Robbins, had con-
structed a track across the right of way for the purpose 
of dumping his waste or ore on the ground adjoining the 
right of way. Where would he have built this track~ 
Suppose that the very next day after he had built it, the 
railroad company desired to use the ground for any pur-
pose, would it have said that Robbins had a right to main-
tain the track there regardless of the use or necessity of 
the railroad 1 The construction of a track for dumping 
purposes by Robbins would be no slight or trivial matter; 
and suppose that it was necessary in the construction of 
this dump track to weaken any of the supports of the 
bridge, would counsel contend that the defendant Robbins 
had this righU Or assume further, that after having 
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built the track across the right of way, and had gone to 
the expense of erecting cribs for the purpose of protect-
ing his dump, and had gone to great expense and labor to 
timber the stope to make it safe, and had made the dump 
and track permanent, and his dump permanent, that im-
mediately the railroad company had said, you will have 
to remoYe your track; would counsel contend that it did 
not have this right~ If the railroad company had de-
t-~ired to limit the tract sought to be condemned or limit 
the use of the property sought to be condemned, it should 
haYe in the first instance made the limitation or reser-
Yation in its original petition or by some appropriate 
means given the limitation or reserYation before the lease 
to Robbins expired. 
A careful reading of the Kansas case, upon which 
counsel rely, will see that it is not in conflict with the 
law as announced by the courts of practically all the 
states, and eYen Kansas follows the same rule as herein 
contended for, as will be seen by an examination of the 
Kansas cases, thus: in Dillon YS. Kansas City, etc., Co., 
Kan. 74, Pac. 251, error was alleged because the court 
bad held that plaintiff was not entitled to the concurrent 
occupancy of a portion of the land flooded with water 
• for the purpose of fishing and hunting, nor to the use of 
water stored thereon, or ice formed on Lake Chanute. 
And upon this question of concurrent occupancy, .the Su-
preme Court of Kansas says: Page 253. 
14 
"Upon all these questions we think the ruling 
of the court correct. As the land in question was 
condemned and the easement paid for by the de-
fendant company, it is entitled to the exclusive 
control of every part thereof actually used by it 
for the purpose of catching and storing water, and 
also all other portions not flooded with water, but 
the occupancy of which is necessary for the pro-
tection of the pond and the conservation of the 
water. Railroad companies are public carriers, 
and are properly held to the highest accountabil-
ity in the performance of their duties. It is high-
ly important to the general traveling public, as 
well as to business interests, that such corpora-
tions have exclusive possession and uninterrupted 
control of all property, the use of which is neces-
sary in the discharge of this service. If the prin-
ciple of concurrent occupation of property used by 
such corporations in carrying on their regular 
traffic should obtain, the expeditious and safe per-
formance of their duties would be difficult, if not 
impossible. Kans. Cent. Ry. Co. vs. Allen, 22 Kan. 
286, 31 Am. Rep. 190; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Manson, 
31 Kan. 337, 2 Pac. 800; K. C. R. Co. vs. Com 'rs. 
Jackson Co., 45 Kan. 716, 26 Pac. 394. There can 
be no concurrent occupancy of railroad property 
in actual use by it in the operation of its business 
without its consent." 
In S. Pa,c. Co. vs. San Francisco Sav. Union, et al., 
Cal., 70 Pac. 961-962, the court held: 
"Whatever minerals lie beneath the surface 
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of the right of way are reserved to the owner, and 
wherever such minerals are in situ underlying 
this right of way, while he may not enter upon it 
to take them (because the nature of the easement 
requires exclusive possession of the surface by 
the company), he can drift from tunnels sunk 
upon his adjoining land and do so, leaving, how-
ever, sufficient support of the easement imposed. 
Subject to this support, the right of the owner of 
the land to take out all minerals beneath the right 
of way is absolute. Under the condemnation, the 
raiiroad company acquired the permanent and ex-
clusive control of the surface of the land, but it 
acquires nothing more.'' 
This case seems to be decisive of the very question 
in issue, the court expressly holding that the land owner 
could not enter upon the right of way because exclusive 
possession was in the company, but he would have to re-
move the minerals by drifts or tunnels from adjoining 
land. 
In Chicago, etc. Railway Company vs. McGrew, Mo. 
15, S. W. 931, the court gave the following instruction, 
page 934: 
"That, except at public or private crossings, 
a railroad company is entitled to the exclusive 
possession of its right of way, and no person has 
the right to come upon such railroad track, nor use 
the surface of such right of way, for any purpose, 
nor can any railroad company grant or consent to 
any such use; this rule being not alone for the 
benefit of the railroad, but also of the public. If 
the jury believe from the evidence that none of 
the devices or means introduced in evidence could 
be erected or made, or, if erected or made, could 
be successfully operated or used, without the 
agents or employees of the defendant getting on 
the right of way of plaintiff, then the jury are in-
structed defendant would not be permitted to erect 
or maintain the same; or if, on the other hand, the 
jury should believe from the evidence that the 
erection, making, or maintenance of any such de-
vice under or over the track, would in any degree 
endanger the operation of such railroad, or the 
safety of the traveling public, no matter how slight 
the danger or how improbable the occurrence may 
be, the defendant would have no right to erect, 
make, or maintain the same, or the railroad com-
pany any authority to consent to any such erec-
tion.'' 
And of this instruction the court says : 
"Though the interest acquired by a railroad 
company to its right of way through condemnation 
proceedings, is regarded as a mere easement, yet 
the law contemplates the right to an absolute and 
e:xdusive possession and control thereof, as 
against the private rights of the owner of the fee, 
the proprietors of adjacent land, and all others. In 
view of the nature of the business of the railroad 
company, and its obligations to the public, such ex-
clusive possession is necessary and proper, in or-
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der that it may perform fully the purpose for 
which it is authorized and used. Judge Redfield, 
in Jackson vs. Railroad Co., 25 Vt. 159, says: 
"The railroad company must have the right 
at all times to the exclusive occupancy of the land 
taken and to exclude all concurrent occupancy by 
the former owner in any mode and for any pur-
pose.'' 
So in this State, one in no manner connected 
with the railroad company, who goes upon its track 
at a plnce other than a public or private crossing, 
is a trespasser. No sufficient reason can be seen 
why, by agreement between the parties interested, 
certain rights not inconsistent with the public in-
terest, might not have been reserved by the land 
owner, so as to secure to himself a limited right of 
way under such circumstances as existed in this 
case. Yet such a reservation must have been by 
consent of both pa1·ties; neither could have been re-
quired to ,r;rant or accept them. Defendant was 
entitled to compensation in money, and could not, 
without his consent, have been required to accept 
in lieu thereof licenses or privileges, however bene-
ficial to him tl~ey may seem to be. After a failure 
to agree on tho compensation or other arrange-
ments mutually satisfactory, the parties go into 
court, not as contracting parties, but as antago-
nists, and each has the right, if he sees fit to do so, 
to stand on his legal rights, and insist on his legal 
remedies, and yield nothing of either." 
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In Railroad Company vs. Stock Yard Co., Mo. 25 
S. W. 399, the condemning company sought to show a 
mitigation of damages by the fact that a driveway or 
dmte for stock had been made underneath its track, thus 
permitting the defendant to drive stock from one yard 
to the other underneath the railroad track; the lower 
court instructed the jury that this could be shown in the 
mitigation of damages, but the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held: 
"Where a railroad company condemning its 
right of way through stockyards does not offer, 
either in its petition or on trial, to reserve to the 
owner a crossing or private way, not required b~­
statute, the fact that it permits the use of such a 
way under its track cannot mitigate the damage~, 
since it is entitled to the use of its whole right~ of 
way for railroad purposes, and revoke such per-
mission at any time.'' 
See also Railway Co. vs. Clark, 25 S. W. 192, in 
which last case the authorities on this question are re-
viewed at great length. The cases last quoted from above 
are directly in point with the case at bar. As a legal 
proposition could anything be more manifest, that if 
Robbins had constructed a track at any point underneath 
the bridge, or had attempted to dump waste or ore upon 
the right of way, that he could have been stopped at· 
once. 
In Fayetteville, etc., Co. vs. Combs, Ark., 11 S. W. 
419, the court says: 
lH 
"The company has the right to the exclusive 
occupancy of the land condemned when it is nec-
essary to the proper operation of the road, and 
the presumption is that it needs and intends to 
use all it takes, leaving nothing of appreciable 
value to the owner. Clayton vs. Ry. Co., Iowa, 25 
N. W. 150. Hollingsworth vs. Iowa, 19 N. W. 323. 
The company's remedy in such case is to condellln 
less.'' 
And in Railroad Co. vs. Raymond, Minn., 33 N. w·. 
104-, it is held that: 
"It is for the railroad company, seeking tJ1e 
appropriation of land to its use, to indicate in its 
petition, the nature and extent of the easeruent 
proposed to be taken.'' 
And the court held that the land owner has not re-
served a right of private crossing unless it is so defined. 
I<~rom the foregoing authorities it must be clear that 
if the plaintiff company had desired that Robbins con-
::-truct tracks underneath its bridge and across its right 
of way and should dump ore or waste upon the condemn-
ed premises, that it should have taken the property with 
those limitations and reservations to Robbins in view. 
vVhile we concede its generosity at this time, still it comes 
at such a late day, more than three years after the lease 
has expired, that we are unable to accept it. Necessity 
is often a virtue, and no doubt the necessities of the case 
caused this sudden and generous outburst of virtue on 
the part of the plaintiff. 
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That removing of this ore was rendered impossi-
ble by the work of the plaintiff, an examination of the 
following testimony will show: 
Dr. Talmage testified that inasmuch as the working 
of the stope was rendered practically impossible without 
dump room, the lease ~as rendered practically valueless, 
and that the removing of the ore so close to the tunnel 
would be extremely hazardous. 
Mr. Zalinski testified that the building of the bridge 
and the construction of the tunnel practically wiped out 
the Robbins lease. (Abs. 177.) 
Mr. Orem, a practical mining man, testified that the 
work of the railroad practically wiped out Mr. Robbins' 
lease. (Abs. 273.) And also did Mr. Jones, (Abs. 274), 
who teRtified that it would be practically suicide to do 
any work in the Robbins stope after the construction of 
the tunnel. Also Mr. Salt, who testified to the same 
thing (Abs. 279), and likewise Mr. Jennings. 
As far as Mr. Robbins was concerned, the taking of 
the property by the plaintiff was to eliminate him entire-
ly and to render his lease absolutely valueless. 
To show the conditions under which Mr. Robbins 
would have to work to remove the ore during the pro-
gress of the work of the plaintiff, we wish to quote the 
following testimony of Mr. Goodrich, the chief engineer 
of the plaintiff, which testimony is found on pages 1141 
and 1142 of the transcript: 
•.···.~ 
11:·· ... ' 
''1 
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"Q. What did your men do when they blast-
ed 7 Leave the hill f 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. While they blasted 7 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And he (Robbins) would have to do the 
same7 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. You mean that he could carry it on pro-
vided he would subject himself to whatever might 
'"" happen to him; in other words, you folks had the 
right of way, and could do as you pleased, couldn't 
you7 
"A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. And build it as you pleased 7 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Well, if you folks wanted to use powder 
you would use powder, wouldn't you 7 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Regardless of what Mr. Robbins want-
ed~ 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. In other words, you would do as you 
pleased, wouldn't you; build it as you pleased, re-
gardless of what Mr. Robbins wanted 7 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. And he would have nothing to say about 
your work or your men~ 
''A. No, sir. 
'' Q. That was true, wasn't it~ 
"A. Yes, sir. 
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'' Q. And it was under those conditions you 
wanted him to remove the ore within this stope, a 
part of which you caved while you were excavating 
on the outside~ Is that true~ 
''A. Yes, I should think he would have to 
do that. 
II. 
As to whether Robbins was acting in good faith m 
taking the lease, and as to the amount of damages : 
It is true that the plaintiff had caused surveys to be 
... 
made before the lease was taken by the defendant Hob-
bins, but these surveys were for a different route than 
that actually constructed. Mr. Robbins and Mr. Bohm 
both testified that they were furnished with a may show-
ing a proposed right of way, (this map has been intro-
duced in evidence and is now an exhibit in the case), and 
it shows the projected line of the railroad at a consider-
able distance below where the road was finally located. 
The construction of the road as thus proposed would not 
have interfered in the least with the mining work or lease 
of Robbins. Further, he was told that it would be neces-
sary to move certain buildings because the road was to 
be constructed on this proposed route farther down the 
canyon, and he had no information whatever that the 
road would be constructed where it was; in fact, all of 
his information was to the contrary, and it was not until 
that he believed that the road would not interfere with 
the leased premises that the lease was given. An exam-
ination of the testimony of Mr. Hobbins all(l ]\,1 r. Bohm, 
. 
... 
.J 
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and of others who were present at the time of the con-
t versation referred to in plaintiff's brief, will show that 
the road to be constructed was to-be at a different point 
from where it was finally located. The question of good 
faith was presented to the jury upon the conflicting 
statements and evidence and the jury no doubt concluded 
that Mr. Robbins did act in good faith. 
That defendant Robbins believed the road would be 
constructed along a different route from where it was 
finally located, and that it would not interfere with his 
workings, will be clearly shown by the following testi-
mony (Abs. 57): 
''At the time I took this lease I got the under-
standing from Mr. Bohm that the railroad was 
coming at a different point from where it did 
come below the point where the bridge is now. It 
would be some 250 feet from where the bridge now 
is. If it had come through at that point, it would 
not have interfered with my working. Mr. Bohm 
was furnished with a blueprint showing the right 
of way at this other place.'' 
As heretofore stated, this is the second trial of the 
cause. The jury in the first case returned a verdict in 
favor of Robbins in the sum of $4,500.00, as will be seen 
by an examination of the record, page 84. Upon the sec-
ond trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant 
Robbins in the sum of $4,000.00. According to the testi-
mony of :Mr. Robbins, he spent on the lease $500 or $600 
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before the railroad company took possession (Abs. 33). 
And had been damaged in the taking of the property be-
tween $12,000.00 and $15,000.00. 
Mr. McCree, a mining expert and practical miner, 
testified (Abs. 63) to the nature of ore that was found in 
the Robbins stope, and of the nature of the ore therein, 
as shown by the samples. These assays were introduced 
in evidence. His estimate of the ore was between 300 
and 400 tons. (Abs. 66.) The values of the samples are 
given (Abs. 79-80), and that the value of the ore net 
to defendant Robbins was shown to be $24.91 a ton. (Abs. 
88.) Mr. Sterling B. Talmage testified to the taking of 
samples and photographs (Abs. 90-91), and also to the 
extent of the ore which he found within the different 
workings of the so-called Robbins stope, and his estimate 
from careful figuring and after making all allowances 
for deductions, was 200 tons of ore that Mr. Robbins 
could take out. This was ore that was actually in sight 
and could be removed without any difficulty. CAbs. 317.) 
Dr. James E. Talmage, a leading mining expert and 
world-famed geologist, described fully how the ore made, 
the samples that he took, and produced photographs 
showing the ore deposits. He stated (Abs. 109) that the 
ore continued in the left-hand finger of the stope 65 feet 
by actual measurement; that it did not then die out, but 
it passed beneath the waste on the floor. That the vein 
·appeared strong in the face, approximately three feet in 
l 
I 
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width. That there were 225 tons of ore exposed, and 
that a very conservative estimate would be 202 tons in 
the stope. (Abs. 110.) 
Mr. Zalinski, another mmmg expert, testified to 
practically the same amount of ore (Abs. 150, 151), and 
of taking of samples and of the value of these samples. 
(Abs. 153, 154.) 
Mr. Jennings, another mining expert, testified (Abs. 
303) that there were at least 225 tons of ore, and that its 
net value was $29.15 per ton. (Abs. 306.) 
Mr. Harry S. Knight, an ore buyer, figured the value 
of the samples and assays, and, according to his values, 
the ore would net more than $20.00 per ton. All this was 
ore that was actually in sight, and did not take into ac-
count the ore that might or might not be uncovered in 
the progress of the working and development of the mine. 
The rule is well settled in this state, as well as in all other 
states, that where there is substantial evidence to support 
the verdict, that the court will not interfere. This rule 
is almost universal, and as announced in Ry. Co. vs. 
George, Mo., 47 S. W. P. 11: 
"The estimate of the damages was the prov-
ince of the jury, and their verdict being supported 
by substantial evidence, having met with the ap-
proval of the court, we are not disposed to inter-
fere.'' 
See also Seattle and etc., Co. vs. Roader, 94 Am. St. 
Rep. 64, where the court says: 
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"We do not feel disposed to substitute our ~ 
own judgment for that of the jury, whose duty it ! 
is to assess the damages, merely because the 
amount may seem to us large, especially where 
there is abundant competent evidence upon which 
to base the verdict.'' 
That this same rule has been adopted in this state, 
the following cases will show: 
Live Stock Co. vs. Live Stock Co., 43 Utah 554, 
Jensen vs. Denver & Rio Grande, 138 Pac. 1185 ; 
Gisborn vs. Milner, 28 Utah 438; 
Thomas vs. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 155 Pac. 
436. 
For counsel to contend there was no ore is the ut-
most folly. The examination of their own evidence dis-
closes that they removed some of this ore from this stope 
and had the same smelted or milled. This ore was mined 
and milled by the plaintiff company for the purpose of 
making evidence in its favor, and it did it for the purpose 
of proving there was no ore of commercial value in this 
block of ground; yet the ore so taken out, as shown by the 
plaintiff's own evidence, was commercially profitable. 
See the exhibit containing the sampling by plaintiff. 
We respectfully submit there is no error in the rec-
ord and that the case should be affirmed. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
Attorney for Defendant, Robbins. 
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